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Abstract: 
The standard models for what doctors must tell their patients are based on the idea of informed consent: 
physicians must provide the information that patients need to make treatment decisions. In fact, though, they 
usually provide considerably more information than this model requires. And rightly so: patients should receive 
enough information that they will not be surprised by whatever happens—unless the physician is also surprised. 
 
Not long ago, I heard myself saying something like the following to my medical ethics class: "So, as physicians 
you will be morally required to provide your patients with any information they need in order to make 
reasonable treatment decisions. But, of course, that is not the only information you will be morally required to 
give them." Soon alter the words left my mouth, I realized that despite what I took to be their obvious and 
unsurprising truth, I had never seen this fact discussed in the medical ethics literatures.
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The issue of informed consent is virally important, and there are many reasons why discussions regarding 
informing patients have tended to take place within that context. What I want to suggest, however, is that 
limiting discussions about informing pa- tients to this context has had an unintended but deleterious effect on 
these discussions. It encourages us to talk as if physicians are required to provide all and only information 
necessary for securing informed consent. In Fact, there are many instances when physicians should—and 
regularly do—provide information that obviously will not affect their patients' decisions. There is not much 
'information that would deter a notmal patient from deciding to have his bio- ken Leg set, yet there is quite a hit 
that any physician would, and should, tell such a patient. Among other things, she should tell him how long he'll 
have to wear the cast, what sort of pain he can expect, and whether and how the break might affect his leg in the 
future. 
 
As the example demonstrates, physicians are already in the habit of providing much more information than 
patients need in order to make reasonable decisions. Nonetheless, an explicit discussion about what they should 
provide is important. So much oldie information that physicians should present is information that no one likes 
to give—this procedure might result in permanent impotence or incontinence, this mended bone may continue 
to ache from time to time, there is a slight chance that this medication will cause your child to be born with a 
birth defect. If we say, time and again, that physicians must provide information for the purpose of gaining 
informered consent, and don't say anything more, it may be too easy to slip into thinking that a certain bit of 
information can be passed over because—as anyone really would agree—there is no chance that information 
about this fact will alter the patient's decision. Some of the models for informed consent might well provide 
good guidance regarding the general information physicians should provide their patients, but if so that seems to 
be purely accidental. Virtually all criticisms and defenses of them have been made in the context of informed 
consent, and none of their authors have encouraged us to use their models in a broader way. 
 
Thus my goals in this paper are twofold. One is to introduce a model for thinking about the general information 
that physicians are morally obligated to give their patients. The other is to provoke discussion of this topic, in 
hopes that others will suggest further models. Although die model I offer does not present the information given 
as that which allows informed consent, if a patient is informed as my model proposes, her consent would be 
informed. In brief, I will argue that a patient should be informed in such a way that, no matter which rational 
option she chooses. She will not be surprised by what happens—unless the informing physician is himself 
surprised. I will refer to the principle on which my model is based as the Principle of Avoiding Surprises.
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Informed Consent and the Law 
It is in the opinions of the courts that we find the first statements of the most commonly cited standard of 
what patients must be told: die 'Reasonable Person" Standard. According to this standard, a physician is re-
quired to give her patient whatever information a reasonable person would want before deciding whether to 
consent to a particular treatment. Although the terms used vary, this criterion seems to have been widely ac-
cepted in legal circles. We find it first in a 1957 opinion from the California Court of Appeals: "A physician 
violates his dun' to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to 
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.”
3
 This opinion was cited 
approvingly in the 1960 Kansas Supreme Court decision in Nathanson v. Kline. Writing for the majority, Judge 
Schroeder added, "So long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed consent, the physician's choice of 
plausible courses should not be called into question . . . .'''
4
 With this opinion, the court seems to deny that 
there's any obligation to give a patient any information beyond what's necessary for informed consent. 
 
The 1972 California decision in Cobbs n Grant further clarifies the limits on a physician's legal obligation to 
inform his patients. "There must be a causal relationship between the physician's failure to inform and the injury 
to the plaintiff Such a causal connection arises only if it is established that had revelation, been made consent 
would not have been given.
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 In other words, if a patient cannot reasonably claim that he would have withheld 
consent if he had received more information, the physician gave him all the information he was required to 
provide. If only one treatment is available for a particular life- threatening condition, the court seemingly would 
not require physicians to give any information about harms the treatment causes, unless those harms were 
severe enough to dissuade some reasonable people from consenting to it. Evidently, information that would not 
have changed die outcome is not important. 
 
It is not surprising that the courts are only concerned about information that makes a practical difference. And 
perhaps the courts' narrower range of concern is quite appropriate, Nonetheless, whether or not physicians have 
a legal obligation to give their patients additional information, clearly they often do. Moreover, they have a 
moral obligation to do so. 
 
Information for Consent 
There are various arguments sup- porting the conclusion that pa- dents should be informed. One common and 
powerful argument goes as follows: There are many situations in which reasonable people have different 
preferences. Reasonable people read different books, eat different foods, and choose different careers. Many of 
the situations in which people need medical care are like this- That is, because of the different costs and benefits 
of different treatment options, reasonable people sometimes prefer different options. If a physician chooses a 
particular treatment for her patient and does not inform him about other options, she might choose a treatment 
that the patient himself would not have chosen, In That case, the patient undergoes harms he would not have 
chosen, or loses possible benefits. 
 
The importance of this Fact is especially obvious when things don't work out as the physician had hoped. When 
this happens, her patient undergoes harms without the predicted benefits. h might even become clear that the 
patient would have been better off pursuing the course of treatment he would have chosen, if he had been 
allowed to make an informed choice. By taking the choice out of his hands, this physician is responsible for the 
harms her patient suffers. In a very real sense, she has caused him those harms. 
 
Unfortunately, this type of argument concedes a point that should be secured- Cr concedes that the reason 
physicians must keep their patients informed is that failing to do so can affect treatment outcome. But the re-
quirement to give patients information cannot test solely on the fact Chat informing patients makes a practical 
difference. 
 
Consider a few scenarios in which patients should receive information even though that information will not 
affect which treatment they receive: First, since incompetent patients do not make treatment decisions, the need 
to inform them cannot be dictated by the need to get informed consent from them. Granted, people who make 
treatment decisions for incompetent patients often seek their input, so giving these patients information can 
affect which treatment they receive. But frequently it does not. Suppose a schizophrenic patient who believes 
that she is immortal is diagnosed with breast cancer. She is not going to be able to give competent consent for 
treatment. Nonetheless, if she receives treatment, that treatment should be described, and she should be told 
about its likely effects. It would be simply cruel to knowingly thrust an incompetent person into a situation in 
which she will face odd and often unpleasant experiences, and to do so without warning. Similarly; even if a 
patient suffering from paranoid schizophrenia will not appropriately appreciate her oncologist's assurances, 
surely she should be told that he now believes her to be cancer-free. 
 
Probably no one would deny that it would also be cruel to knowingly place a competent person in a situation in 
which she will be surprised by odd and unpleasant experiences. It is easy to assume that patients will not be 
surprised if they have received sufficient information to make an informed decision, but this is not so. Imagine a 
situation in which a patient suffering from a serious malady is deciding between two operations. If a reasonable 
person might choose either operation, the physician seeking informed consent must tell his patient the pluses 
and minuses of each option as measured against the other. But let's suppose that whichever operation the patient 
chooses, the same anesthesiologist will assist, and he will use the same anesthesia. In fact, let's stipulate that 
precisely the same risks from the anesthesia are to be expected no matter which operation the patient chooses, 
and that these risks are minimal. as compared against what will happen if she doesn't have an operation. In this 
case, knowing the risks associated with the anesthesia cannot reasonably affect the patient's choice. 
Nonetheless, surely the patient should be informed about the risks and likely effects of that anesthesia. 
 
In fact, much of the information people want is not information that will have any bearing on their decisions. 
For instance, if someone to comes to the hospital suffering from appendicitis, very little of the information she 
should receive could reasonably be expected to cause her to forgo the appendectomy. Much of the information 
patients need in order to make informed decisions is very general. But most patients want relatively detailed 
information about the pain they are likely to have, how lo it will be before they can return to normal activities, 
and so on. 
 
Such cases show that there is a significant C gap between the information that the typical patient wants and the 
information that the Reasonable Pereson Model requires physicians to provide. That model requires only that 
physicians give their patients information that will play a causal role in their reasonable decisionmaking. Muck 
of the information patients want is simply not of this type. 
 
Avoiding Surprises 
That patients want, and expect, information that will not a cc their treatment decisions is nicely, illustrated by 
the following passage: 
 
Imagine my surprise—no, m. shock and disbelief—when learned that my hoarseness was attributable to unilateral vocal cord 
paralysis. In anticipation of m' partial thyroidectomy, I'd been worried about cancer, 1101 a darn aged vocal cord. . . Only after could 
barely speak above a whisper did I learn that vocal cord paralysis is a primary complication of thyroidectomy... 
 
Today I still believe that f took thy correct course of action and hat the best providers. Yet it is my perception that a moral wrong 
occurred-the failure to disclose material risk that I would have undertaken but that I deserved to know about. This wrong was an in 
suit to my dignity, and it affected the trust I placed in my physician in his role as information gatekeeper.
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This passage perfectly illustrates an actual situation in which a patient felt that her physician wronged her by 
withholding information, even though she acknowledges chat the information would not have affected her 
decision. If this patient's Feeling is reasonable, and I think it is, the decision to withhold a specific hit of in-
formation cannot be made on the basis of the fact that the information will not alter the patient's decision— as 
allowed by the Reasonable Person Model- What guide, then, might physicians use? My suggestion is that 
reasonable patients want whatever information will keep them from being surprised. and—to the extent possi-
ble—this is what physicians should provide. (There are exceptions, of course. For example, some patients 
clearly state that they prefer not to know. In such eases, withholding information is certainly permissible, and 
usually required.)  
 
I noted that it is cruel to knowingly let a person be unnecessarily surprised by unpleasant experiences. it's an 
interesting fact about its that whether or not something is a surprise matters. That goes for good things as well 
as bad. We like good surprises, and our enjoyment of them is not merely the enjoyment we get from receiving 
nice things- It is usually more Fun to win the lottery than to come of age and receive a long-expected inher-
itance. But we also dislike being surprised by unpleasant things, and out dislike of this is something over-and-
above our dislike of the unpleasant things themselves. This is true of bad news in general, and of had news con-
cerning ones health in particular. 
 
One reason we prefer not to be surprised by unpleasant events is that with prior information we can often avoid 
them altogether, or at least alter conditions so as to minimize the damage. Carriers of Thy-Sachs can choose to 
adopt, and people in danger of developing diabetes can alter their diet. But these are not the only reasons we 
prefer not to be surprised by unpleasant experiences. There is a certain security, simply in knowing where one 
stands. 
 
What is the moral significance of the Fact that people generally prefer that their unpleasant experiences not be 
surprises? It means, all else being equal, that it is morally good to provide the relevant information and thereby 
prevent them from being surprised. Of course, everything else is not always equal. A person might prefer not to 
be rested for Huntington's, for instance, because he does not want to live the rest of his life with the knowledge 
that he will develop the disease. Nonetheless, without specific reason to believe otherwise, the fact that we 
normally dislike had surprises is good reason to believe that any given patient prefers to hear even the had news. 
 
But are physicians morally obligated to give their patients unpleasant information that will not affect their treat-
ment decisions, or is doing so beyond the call of duty? Insofar as physicians have a duty to care for the whole 
person, and not merely to repair the damage caused by illness and injury, it seems to me that they do have an 
obligation to give patients this information- Moreover, people can become obligated to behave in a certain way 
by fostering in others the expectation that they will. Although we might not normally think about it this way, 
physicians encourage the belief that they are not withholding unpleasant information. Even using the words 
"Don't worry" can leave a patient with the impression that there is nothing further to worry -about. It seems fair 
to say that in our culture, the profession as a whole intends to cultivate the impression that patients are provided 
with all the information that is of concern to them—not merely the information that affects their decisions. 
 
Of course, physicians are also obligated to provide their patients with relevant good news. In this case, what is 
to be avoided is not the good surprise—good surprises are good. in stead, what is to be avoided is unnecessary 
worry. If a person has substantial financial worries, knowing ahead of time that he will receive money in six 
months is typically better than winning a lottery after six months of anxiety. Also, such information can have a 
practical effect on other life decisions the patient might be making. Thus, even though good surprises are good, 
physicians should strive to avoid allowing their patients to he surprised, whether the surprises are bad or good. 
Fortunately. physicians ,ire rarely tempted to keep good news to themselves. 
 
Unfortunately, even with the best will in the world, a physician cannot guarantee that her patient will never be 
surprised. It is of the nature of disease and treatment that unpredictable events occur. The most that can be 
asked for is that, at least when dealing with a competent patient, the physician inform him of all the significant 
foreseeable consequences of reasonable treatment options and of the disease or injury itself That is, she should 
be able to give him enough information about what is likely to happen that if, in the end, the patient is still 
surprised, the physician herself will be surprised as well. In other words, the physician should ensure that the 
patient undergoes no unsurprising surprises. 
 
The Unsurprising Surprise 
When is a surprise unsurprising? can say a bit more about what I mean when I say that physicians should 
mention any events that would not surprise them, but which they believe would surprise their patients. I do not 
mean that as long as a physician is inclined to say "I'd be surprised if such-and-such happened," she isn't 
obligated to mention the possibility of such-and-such. We often use this way of speaking even though we would 
not, in fact, be surprised if such-and-such happened. Sometimes we use the phrase simply to indicate char we 
believe that another outcome is much more likely. When the less likely event does occur we are not necessarily 
surprised in any substantial sense. If the physician would not feel surprise at an events occurrence, but knows 
her patient would be, she should mention it. 
 
No matter what account is given of "unsurprising surprise," there will still be instances when it's impossible to 
say whether the occurrence of a certain side effect or complication counts as an unsurprising surprise. But there 
also seems to be a gray area where there is no objective fact of the matter about whether a physician is obligated 
to give her patient information about a specific, very unlikely side effect or complication. In other words, 
regardless of how we think about these issues, there will be borderline cases of unsurprising surprises and 
borderline cases of the physician's obligation to tell. Rather than counting against the unsurprising surprises 
criterion for informing patients, however, these parallel sets of borderline cases help to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of the criterion. It is unclear whether a physician is obligated to mention a given side effect or 
complication in precisely those instances in which it is unclear whether that side effect or complication would 
come as an unsurprising surprise. 
 
Imagine a physician who has been giving a particular patient a flu shot every year for the past seven years. 
Imagine that the physician has previously told his patient that she might experience flu symptoms as a result of 
the inoculation, and he knows-from the patient's own earlier reports-that she has experienced such symptoms in 
the past- Must he remind her that she may experience the same symptoms this time: It is probably a good idea, 
but if he does not remind her, has he Wed Co do his duty? On the one hand, he knows that the patient is aware 
that flu shots can cause such symptoms, and therefore he has very good reason for thinking that the symptoms 
would not surprise her. On the other hand, people often forget about possibilities they know exist, and so he 
knows that the symptoms might (initially) surprise the patient, even though she,d quickly figure out what caused 
them. Although it is unlikely that the patient would be surprised by flu symptoms, if they occurred, insofar as it 
is possible that they would come as an unsurprising surprise, this is a borderline ease of something the physician 
has an obligation to mention. 
 
That this is a borderline case becomes dearer if we contrast it with cases that arc not on the borderline. If we 
were talking about a patient who receives a shot every week, and who experiences side effects about half the 
time, there would be no reason to think that she would be surprised the next rime she experienced that side 
effect. In this case the physician would not be obligated to repeat the same information every week. In contrast, 
if the patient received a certain shot once a decade, there would be much more reason to think that she might be 
surprised if she experienced side effects-and accordingly there is a much clearer obligation to remind her about 
the possibility of those side effects. Thus, as it becomes clearer that the occurrence of a certain side effect would 
(or would not) surprise the patient, it also becomes clearer that the physician is (or is not) obligated to mention 
the possibility of that side effect. 
 
Even when it is obvious that the occurrence of a side effect or complication would surprise the patient, it can 
still be unclear- whether it would be an unsurprising surprise. This is because it can be unclear whether the 
occurrence would surprise the physician. If there is a 10 percent chance that a certain medication or procedure 
would cause a seizure, the physician should not be surprised if it does, and should certainly mention the 
possibility. But the more surprising he side effect or complication would be to the physician, the more plausible 
it is that he is not obligated to mention it. For instance, there is a I percent chance that a patient will hay a 
seizure after taking a tricyclic antidepressant. Would a physician be surprised if his patient becomes that cine in 
one hundred? Some would be, lad some would not. It is also less than entirely dear whether or not physicians 
who prescribe these antidepressants are obligated to mention possibility of seizures.  
 
Supplementation of the Principle 
Although the Principle of Avoiding (Unsurprising) Surprises is good rule of thumb, it would work all by itself. 
If we literally took avoiding surprising patients as our guide, then we would have no reason to inform patients 
about the possibility of dying on the operating table. Any patient who dies on the operating table is clearly 
incapable of being surprised by that fact. But surgeons are certainly obligated to make sure their patients have 
this type of information. And, of course, they routinely do. A physician could also minimize the likelihood of 
surprises simply by withholding information about a treatment whenever she can't guarantee the treatment's 
outcome. If a patient is virtually certain to die of a specific cancer unless he is treated, while aggressive 
treatment has an 80 percent success rate, the patient who does not know about the possibility of treatment will 
be much less surprised as his illness progresses. While the patient who knows about and chooses treatment 
might he surprised if that treatment is ineffective. This is obviously no reason to withhold information about the 
treatment. 
 
Thus, I am not proposing that physicians seek simply CO avoid unsurprising surprises. Like most people who 
have suggested models for informed consent, I believe that informing patients involves telling them about all 
rational treatment options. But what must patients be told about these options? 
 
Each model for informed consent specifies slightly different information. Nonetheless, all intend to ensure that 
patients have the information they need in order to give informed consent, and none require physicians to pass 
along allegedly "unnecessary" information. My model, based on the Principle of Avoiding Surprises, also gives 
physicians a guide to what they should tell their patients about treatment options: a physician is obligated to 
inform his patient about each rational treatment alternative, and to inform her in a way that ensures she will 
encounter as few unsurprising surprises as possible, regardless of which option she chooses. Some of the 
information the patient receives will have no bearing on her decision, but if she receives the information 
specified she will have (mote than) enough to make an informed decision. 
 
In addition to mentioning all rational treatment options and the possible effects of choosing those options, it is 
important chat physicians provide information about the likelihood of those effects. (This is certainly something 
all models of informed consent also require.) Although information about specific probabilities is not, in itself, 
information that will keep patients horn being surprised, our model must certainly require it. We have already 
said chat physicians should provide information about the possible effects of a certain set of treatment options. 
We can now supplement that claim by adding chat for each of the possible effects specified- the physician 
should tell his patient the likelihood of that effect. 
 
So, according to the model based on the Principle of Avoiding Surprises, physicians should provide their pa-
tients with information about: 
 
1) Each rational treatment option, including the option of no treatment at all. 
2) For each rational treatment option, any effect that would surprise the patient, but which would not 
surprise the physician. 
3) The likelihood of any effect mentioned in 2). 
 
Following the traditional discussion of informing patients, we have focused on the information a physician must 
provide before the patient makes a treatment decision. It is worth hearing in mind, however, that physicians 
often gain further information as the patient’s treatment and recovery progress. The same sort of Avoiding 
Surprises principle should be applied to this information- If, daring recovery, a physician comes to expect the- 
patient to exhibit certain responses he did not initially expect—so that these responses will no longer surprise 
him, but would surprise his patient—he should pass that information along. And this information should 
certainly be provided regardless of whether there are any new decisions to be made. Similarly, if the physician 's 
estimates concerning the likelihood of certain events change significantly during this process, the patient should 
be (and I'm sure generally is) informed of this. 
 
It is also important to note that in presenting the Avoiding Surprises model for informing patients I am at-
tempting to describe a duty special to physicians,
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 They have a special duty to make sure that their patients are 
not surprised by certain sorts of things—specifically, what they will experience as a result of disease or 
treatment. Other people do not have this duty. For instance, if I ovethear a patient's prognosis, I have no obliga-
tion to make sure the patient receives this information, and that's true even if I have reason to believe that physi-
cians are withholding it horn her. On the other side, there are plenty of unpleasant surprises a physician might 
know about without being obligated to inform his patient. He is not obligated to tell his patient that he has seen 
her boyfriend in the hospital hallway walking hand-in-hand with some other woman. 
 
But some of the information a physician is morally obligated to provide is information anyone would be 
obligated to provide. That is, it is not information that she is required to provide because she has a special duty. 
This information will not be specified by the model we have been discussing. So, for instance, even though it 
has nothing to do with treatment or disease, if the physician knows that someone has slipped strychnine in the 
patient's orange juice, she's obligated to tell him that. But I would be obligated to tell him that too. Somewhat 
more realistically, if the patient is suffering any harm because of a culpable mistake made by the physician, this 
is information the physician must own up to.
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 And he must own up to it even if the harm is one the patient knew 
she might experience. But again, the same is true of anyone who makes a culpable mistake. If I’ve agreed to 
take care of your plants while you arc away, but never actually bother to come by and water them, I should 
admit my negligence. And I should admit this regardless of the fact that, before you left, I warned you that I 
don't have a green thumb and the plants I diligently care for sometimes die. 
 
Two Informed Consent Models  
I have contrasted my model for informing patients with the Reasonable Person Model—one of the models 
focused on the information that physicians must provide in order to obtain informed consent. I have dwelt on 
this model because it appears to be the default used in most discussions of informing patients, but discontent 
with the Reasonable Person Model has led to the development of a few alternatives. Although the alternatives 
also focus on the information that patients need for making informed decisions, it's useful to compare a couple 
of the more successful of them with my Avoiding Surprises model. The alternatives may be improvements on 
the Reasonable Person Model, but they remain constrained by the assumption that physicians are required to 
provide only that information necessary for informed consent. 
 
The Transparency Model
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 One model sometimes contrasted with the Reasonable Person Model is Howard 
Brody's 'Transparency Model. According to Brody, the Reasonable Person Model has caused physicians to 
feel they must mention every danger associated with a treatment, no matter how trivial or unlikely. The idea 
seems to be that if something bad happens as a result of a given treatment it can always be argued that any 
reasonable person would have wanted to know about that possibility. This results in unnecessarily alarming 
patients and overwhelming them with minimally useful information. 
 
Borrowing from Jay Katz, Brody prefers allowing physicians to use their own good sense when informing 
patients.
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 Instead of specifying what information they should give, Brody simply suggests that they make their 
thought process transparent to their patients. In this way Brody respects die physician's knowledge while at the 
same time providing guidance about how patients should he informed. The Factors the physician is obligated to 
mention are just chose that played a role in her own thinking, whatever they may be. 
 
This model also allows for a way of determining whether a physician provided her patient with sufficient in-
formation. We simply ask the physician to describe how she arrived at her treatment decision. If the patient 
agrees that the physician gave him this information, and the physician is describing a reasonable way of coming 
to a decision, then she has done nothing wrong. She is in the wrong only if she did not give her patient the infor-
mation she describes, or if she ignored important facts in her own considerations. Brody notes that in this 
second case the physician is guilty of negligence in making treatment decisions, not of failing to provide the 
tight information. 
 
In addition to this distinction between negligence and failure to inform, there is much to admire about the 
Transparency Model. For instance, while many models assume that patients must be protected from their 
physicians, the Transparency Model dearly recognizes that physicians are concerned about the wellbeing of 
their patients- Nonetheless, I have two significant worries about it. One, of course, is that it cakes into ac- 1 
count only information necessary for informed consent. The other is that it does not provide as much guidance 
as it at first appears to do. The Avoiding Surprises model provides more guidance while at the same time 
respecting Brody's observation that physicians are experts and are genuinely concerned for their patients. 
 
The distinction Brody makes between failure to inform a patient and negligence in medical decisionmaking is 
excellent, but that distinction se is to leave him another project-that of characterizing the information ac 
physicians are morally obligated to take into account in order to avoid negligence. Brody often seems to assume 
that physicians are obligated to take into consideration whatever factors a reasonable person would take into 
account. But if a physician's decision must take into account whatever a reasonable person would consider,  
and the physician is required to make her decision making transparent, then she must give her patient whatever 
information a reasonable person would want—precisely the same as the reasonable Person Model he has 
rejected. 
 
There is another reason for thinking that Brody's view does not provide as much guidance as it at first appears. 
As we have seen, he suggests that physicians make their own decision-making process transparent to the 
patient. But this assumes that decision- making processes are transparent to decisionmakers. There are at least 
two reasons for worrying that they aren't. First, and most obviously, a person's decision can be influenced by 
things he is unaware of. For instance, anecdotal stories about the effectiveness of a drug can give a Person the 
sense that the drug is better than alternatives, and this impression can be bard to shake even. When one knows t 
at good studies have shown the drugs to be equally effective. 
 
Another concern, however, is that some factors cross a physician's mind but are immediately dismissed. )to 
immediately dismissed thoughts p y a role in decisionmaking? The answer is not obvious- When he is deciding 
whether to prescribe a certain medication, it might cross a physician's mind that he once heard a colleague say a 
patient of hers had reacted very badly to that medication. If all of the studies he has read show the medication is 
safe, and none document that reaction, he may decide that the anecdote is unimportant. Was his thought about 
the anecdote part of his decisionmaking process? 
 
There are two possibilities: Either it was, or it WAS not. If it was—if each such thought counts as part of the 
decisionmaking process—then the Transparency Model requires the physician to mention it- But then a 
physician is required to mention any outcome, no matter how unlikely, as long as the thought of it entered his 
mind. On this reading, Brody's model requires physicians to pass along at least as much minimally relevant 
information as the Reasonable Person Model, and it probably requires the thoughtful physician to provide even 
more minimally relevant information. 
 
Alternatively, perhaps the physician is justified in dismissing some thought-of factors as wholly irrelevant  to 
his decisionmaking. In that case, these factors need not be mentioned. But then how are we to determine which 
thoughts are relevant and which are not? Without more guidance, the Transparency Model generates many 
borderline cases, many cases in which physicians will not be sure whether a particular factor played a role in 
their decision-making- Brody might suggest char any factor a reasonable person would consider significant 
should be taken to play a role. Unfortunately, this would bring the Transparency Model very close to the 
Reasonable Person Model again, and would again promote precisely the same problems that caused Brody to 
reject that model in the first place. 
 
Although avoiding the generation of borderline cases seems preferable. In fact, the borderline cases would not 
pose a problem if Brody could support a uniform way of dealing with them. But that route does not seem 
promising. He cannot advise the physician to "err on the side of caution" and pass along any information that 
might have played a role in his decisionmaking. We have already seen that there is bound to be much too much 
of it. On the other hand, neither can he say, in a blanket way, that all borderline information may be withheld. If 
everything else strongly argues in favor of prescribing a particular antidepressant for a severely depressed 
patient, a physician might believe that the 25 percent chance of sexual dysfunction is not sufficient to affect his 
own decision. This is especially likely if it is clear that knowledge of this possible side effect would not deter 
the patient from raking die antideptessant. Nonetheless, it probably should be mentioned. Thus the 
Transparency Model creates many borderline cases and can support no consistent way of dealing with them. 
 
A model based on the Principle of Avoiding Unsurprising Surprises provides both more guidance and a plau-
sible way of dealing with borderline cases. A physician need iiot decide whether a particular thought played a 
role in her decisionmaking. Rather. she must consider whether the occurrence of the event would surprise her 
patient. If it would surprise hint, she must consider whether its occurrence would also surptise her. If it would 
surprise her patient. but would not surprise her, she should mention it. 
 
We can see how this works with a couple of quick examples. 
 
If studies show there is a 20 percent chance that the drug he is prescribing will cause nausea, and the physician 
has no reason to believe his patient is aware of this, then the physician should certainly mention it. Failure to do 
so risks allowing his patient to suffer a surprise he himself would not find surprising. But this does not mean 
that physicians must mention every possible reaction char might surprise their patients. Imagine that a colleague 
has mentioned that she believes the drug you are considering was responsible for heart palpitations in one of her 
patients. But imagine, farther, that many studies have been done on this medication, and none indicate this as a 
side effect. No doubt your patient would be surprised if he develops palpitations, but if this anecdote is your 
only reason for thinking that heart palpitations are a possibility, and many studies indicate that it is not, it is 
reasonable to assume that you would also be surprised. Thus, although heart palpitations would be a surprise to 
the patient. they would be a surprising surprise, and therefore you are not obligated to mention this possibility. 
Neither are physicians obligated to tell adult patients that they will experience a slightly painful pricking sensa-
tion when they get simple inoculations. They know this already. It is not an unsurprising surprise. It isn't any 
kind of surprise. 
 
Of course, deciding whether a patient would be surprised is not always a trivial matter. Nor is it always easy for 
a physician to know whether he, himself, would be surprised by a given outcome. Thus the model will generate 
some borderline cases. It will generate fewer of them, however, and it can support a uniform policy for dealing 
with them- We usually have a pretty good idea about whether or not a person will be surprised by a given 
outcome, so there will be relatively few borderline cases. If a physician is genuinely unsure, however, it is prob-
ably a good idea to pass that information along. Adopting this as a general policy will help to avoid unwelcome 
surprises, but it will not require providing as much dubiously relevant information as would be required by a 
similar policy with the borderline cases of the Transparency Model. 
 
Bioethics, I have argued that the current focus on informed consent encourages us to assume that the only 
reason to give patients information is to ensure that they can give informed consent. Evidence of this kind of 
skewing of the discussion can be seen in the medical ethics textbook, Bioethics A Return to Fundamentals, by 
Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser.
11 
 
Unlike Brody. Gem Culver, and Clouser do not propose a model explicitly designed to specify the information 
patients must be given. Instead, they apply Bernard Gert's general moral theory to that question.
12
 Or, rather, 
they apply is to the question of the information physicians are required to provide patients for the purpose of 
gaining informed consent. That is, even though they are applying a general moral theory to a question about the 
information patients should be given, they seem unaware chat physicians might be obligated to provide any 
information beyond what will affect the patient's decision. Their narrow Focus is well highlighted by the fact 
that the section entitled "The process of giving information to patients" begins with the observation that "The 
length of time required for the consent process varies from situation to situation."
13 
 
Their account starts from the claim that fading to properly inform patients constitutes deception, which they 
hold is prima facie wrong. Thus, on their view, failing to provide patients with adequate information is immoral 
because it constitutes deception.14 That, of course, raises the question of what this information is supposed to 
be adequate for: 
 
For a physician to withhold adequate information from a patient, without that patient's consent, would count as 
deception and Thus need moral justification- But what kind of information passes the test of "adequacy"' An 
accurate but too-general answer is, that information that any rational person would want to know before making 
a decision.
15
 
 
In short, Gert, Culver, and Clouser hold that physicians can avoid deceiving their patients simply by providing 
the information a reasonable person would want before making a decision. But if a physician knows that his pa-
tient would be surprised by a possible result of treatment, and he does not mention it to her, he still deceives 
her—even if he correctly believes that knowledge of that possible result would not affect her decision. All else 
being equal, physicians should certainly avoid deception- But doing so does not merely mean providing the 
information necessary for gaining informed consent. 
 
To explain why deceiving patients is Unmoral, Gen, Culver, and Clouser begin by noting char, due to circum-
stances and individual likes and dislikes, different rational people have different preferences. Because of this, 
giving patients 
 
less than full information introduces the possibility Chat patients will make some choice other than the one 
closest to their own ranking of harms… Thus partial disclosure can, from the patient's point of view, cause 
significant avoidable harm, which explains why less than full disclosure on the part of physicians is deceptive 
and morally unacceptable.
16
 
 
In other words, failing to inform a patient is immoral because it can have important practical consequences. A 
patient who is less than fully informed might make a choice she would not have made if she had been fully 
informed. If she then suffers harms as a result of her uninformed choice, the person who should have informed 
her has caused those has. Those who fail to inform, when obligated to do so, are responsible for the resulting 
negative consequences. 
 
This argument should seem familiar, as it is precisely the argument is discussed above. And the answer is the 
same: it is certainly true that one a- son physicians should keep patients informed is that failure to do so an have 
negative practical consequences, but this by itself does not explain "why less than hall disclosure on the part of 
physicians is . . . morally unacceptable." Failures to disclose can be morally unacceptable even when there are 
no practical consequences. And even if withholding a piece of information would not affect the patient's 
decision, it can have a negative consequence: it can make the patient feel betrayed. 
 
Making Illness Less Awful 
The recurring refrain of this paper has been that discussions of informed consent have had an unfortunate and 
no doubt unintended effect on the way we write about the physician’s obligation to inform her patients. They 
have encouraged us to assume that the information physicians are required to give their patients consists entirely 
of information those patients need in order to make rata al treatment decisions. 
 
Yet few really believe that the only reason to give patients information n about their illnesses is so that they n 
make treatment decisions. All physicians give more information than this. Being ill is disagreeable enough 
without the unpleasant surprises that can result from illnesses and attempts to treat them, or from the anxiety of 
worrying about those surprises. Physicians, as caretakers, have a duty to prevent what surprises they can. 
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